Turkey: American Relentess Pressure Versus Public Opinion
U.S. pushed for awkward timing aas insensitive to religious holiday
RICHARD BOUDREAUX
SPECIAL TO THE STAR Mar. 3, 2003. 12:42 AM
ANKARA—Early last month, United States Vice-President Dick Cheney telephoned Turkey's prime minister with an urgent message: The Bush administration wanted the country's parliament to vote within days — just before the Muslim holiday of Bayram — on a request to base U.S. troops in Turkey for an assault on Iraq.
The timing of the pressure struck a raw nerve here, one that was still aching when Turkish lawmakers finally took up the request Saturday and dealt it a surprise defeat. As Turks offered explanations yesterday for this stinging defiance of their strongest ally, tales of American insensitivity were high on the list.
Religious feelings run deep here before and during Bayram. It was going to be hard enough for Washington to persuade one predominantly Muslim country to join in war against another. But Cheney was making his pitch to an Islamist-led government at an awkward time.
The government's lawmakers were about to head home to join pious constituents for a week of fasting and prayer.
Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, a reluctant supporter of the U.S. request, told Cheney no, a vote in parliament would have to wait, according to Turks familiar with the conversation. But word of the call got around, adding to a series of blunders by both the Bush administration and Gul's government that now seem to have doomed the Pentagon's goal of a northern front against Saddam Hussein.
"We don't like the way we were pushed around by the Americans,'' said Emin Sirin, one of dozens of lawmakers from the ruling Justice and Development Party who defied its leaders and voted against the U.S. deal.
"The Americans kept giving ultimatums and deadlines, asking Turkey to jump into a barrel of fire," he said. "They seemed to think we could be bought off, but we had real security concerns about what Iraq would look like after Saddam. They never addressed those concerns.''
Saturday's vote, which fell three short of the majority required by Turkish law, was a study in miscalculation. The ruling party's leader, Recep Rayyip Erdogan, joined Gul in endorsing the deployment resolution, and they had good reason to predict its passage. The party had swept 362 of the Parliament's 550 seats in November elections.
But the party managed just 264 votes in favour. The rebellion by more than a quarter of its deputies, whose support had been taken for granted, and a unified stand by the opposition yielded 250 votes against the proposal and 19 abstentions. The other 17 lawmakers were absent.
The proposal would have authorized 62,000 U.S. troops, 255 warplanes and 65 helicopters to move through Turkey to bases along the country's 355-kilometre-long border with Iraq, creating a force that could attack the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, from the north while a larger U.S. force based in the Persian Gulf moved up from the south. Such a two-pronged assault, American officials say, would shorten any war to disarm Saddam, minimizing U.S. casualties.
American officials said yesterday that they would keep an armada of U.S. warships waiting off Turkey's coast with tanks and equipment, in the hope that Turkey will soon reverse its decision. They warned, however, that the Pentagon is running out of time to decide whether the vessels — and the troops they would supply — should change course and head for the Gulf.
The parliament's decision left the Turkish government stunned and discredited. Some analysts said a rush to a new vote would be risky because a second defeat would further weaken the government's hold on power.
"The proposal has been delayed for an open-ended time," Eyup Fatsa, the Justice and Development deputy chairman, told reporters yesterday after a closed meeting of the party's governing board. "There is no proposal for the immediate future.''
The government has been under relentless U.S. lobbying since taking office four months ago, forced to choose between Turkey's powerful benefactor and a public that opposes war in Iraq by a 4-1 margin in opinion surveys. Turks historically are averse to large numbers of foreign troops on their soil and fear a repeat of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when a half-million refugees poured across the border from Iraq and Turkey's economy was devastated. Some analysts say antiwar demonstrations across Europe last month hardened popular sentiment.
Turkey's armed forces, which usually dictate policy behind the scenes but are divided over the prospect of war, left the decision to the civilian leadership.
Gul and Erdogan responded with mixed signals. After making no secret of their distaste for American war plans, the two men suddenly began arguing in recent weeks that Turkey might benefit by co-operating in a war — for example, by gaining influence in the affairs of postwar Iraq and being able to restore trade with a neighbour freed from international sanctions.
For their part, U.S. officials believed the Turks could not afford to turn them down. On the assumption that Turkish leaders understood this, officials led by Paul D. Wolfowitz, the deputy defence secretary, kept pressing hard for a decision. When Turkey balked, U.S. officials, in private comments to reporters, often questioned the country's value as an ally.
Turkey: American Relentess Pressure Versus Public Opinion
U.S. pushed for awkward timing aas insensitive to religious holiday
RICHARD BOUDREAUX
SPECIAL TO THE STAR Mar. 3, 2003. 12:42 AM
ANKARA—Early last month, United States Vice-President Dick Cheney telephoned Turkey's prime minister with an urgent message: The Bush administration wanted the country's parliament to vote within days — just before the Muslim holiday of Bayram — on a request to base U.S. troops in Turkey for an assault on Iraq.
The timing of the pressure struck a raw nerve here, one that was still aching when Turkish lawmakers finally took up the request Saturday and dealt it a surprise defeat. As Turks offered explanations yesterday for this stinging defiance of their strongest ally, tales of American insensitivity were high on the list.
Religious feelings run deep here before and during Bayram. It was going to be hard enough for Washington to persuade one predominantly Muslim country to join in war against another. But Cheney was making his pitch to an Islamist-led government at an awkward time.
The government's lawmakers were about to head home to join pious constituents for a week of fasting and prayer.
Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, a reluctant supporter of the U.S. request, told Cheney no, a vote in parliament would have to wait, according to Turks familiar with the conversation. But word of the call got around, adding to a series of blunders by both the Bush administration and Gul's government that now seem to have doomed the Pentagon's goal of a northern front against Saddam Hussein.
"We don't like the way we were pushed around by the Americans,'' said Emin Sirin, one of dozens of lawmakers from the ruling Justice and Development Party who defied its leaders and voted against the U.S. deal.
"The Americans kept giving ultimatums and deadlines, asking Turkey to jump into a barrel of fire," he said. "They seemed to think we could be bought off, but we had real security concerns about what Iraq would look like after Saddam. They never addressed those concerns.''
Saturday's vote, which fell three short of the majority required by Turkish law, was a study in miscalculation. The ruling party's leader, Recep Rayyip Erdogan, joined Gul in endorsing the deployment resolution, and they had good reason to predict its passage. The party had swept 362 of the Parliament's 550 seats in November elections.
But the party managed just 264 votes in favour. The rebellion by more than a quarter of its deputies, whose support had been taken for granted, and a unified stand by the opposition yielded 250 votes against the proposal and 19 abstentions. The other 17 lawmakers were absent.
The proposal would have authorized 62,000 U.S. troops, 255 warplanes and 65 helicopters to move through Turkey to bases along the country's 355-kilometre-long border with Iraq, creating a force that could attack the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, from the north while a larger U.S. force based in the Persian Gulf moved up from the south. Such a two-pronged assault, American officials say, would shorten any war to disarm Saddam, minimizing U.S. casualties.
American officials said yesterday that they would keep an armada of U.S. warships waiting off Turkey's coast with tanks and equipment, in the hope that Turkey will soon reverse its decision. They warned, however, that the Pentagon is running out of time to decide whether the vessels — and the troops they would supply — should change course and head for the Gulf.
The parliament's decision left the Turkish government stunned and discredited. Some analysts said a rush to a new vote would be risky because a second defeat would further weaken the government's hold on power.
"The proposal has been delayed for an open-ended time," Eyup Fatsa, the Justice and Development deputy chairman, told reporters yesterday after a closed meeting of the party's governing board. "There is no proposal for the immediate future.''
The government has been under relentless U.S. lobbying since taking office four months ago, forced to choose between Turkey's powerful benefactor and a public that opposes war in Iraq by a 4-1 margin in opinion surveys. Turks historically are averse to large numbers of foreign troops on their soil and fear a repeat of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when a half-million refugees poured across the border from Iraq and Turkey's economy was devastated. Some analysts say antiwar demonstrations across Europe last month hardened popular sentiment.
Turkey's armed forces, which usually dictate policy behind the scenes but are divided over the prospect of war, left the decision to the civilian leadership.
Gul and Erdogan responded with mixed signals. After making no secret of their distaste for American war plans, the two men suddenly began arguing in recent weeks that Turkey might benefit by co-operating in a war — for example, by gaining influence in the affairs of postwar Iraq and being able to restore trade with a neighbour freed from international sanctions.
For their part, U.S. officials believed the Turks could not afford to turn them down. On the assumption that Turkish leaders understood this, officials led by Paul D. Wolfowitz, the deputy defence secretary, kept pressing hard for a decision. When Turkey balked, U.S. officials, in private comments to reporters, often questioned the country's value as an ally.
