Declassified US Document :TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA- 1967
WASHINGTON - US officials rejected the use of tactical nuclear weapons during the Vietnam War because of the catastrophic effect such a strike would have had on US global interests and the possibility that US forces "would be essentially annihilated" in retaliatory raids by nuclear-armed guerrilla forces, according to participants in a secret Pentagon study released March 9 by the Nautilus Institute, a California research group.
Senator Dianne Feinstein, D-CA, read parts of the declassified report, written by a group of scientists known as the Jasons, into the Congressional Record on Monday.
"The conclusions of the Jason report are as valid, realistic and frightening today as they were in 1967," Senator Feinstein said in a statement on the Senate floor. "I sincerely believe that any first use of nuclear weapons by the United States can not and should not be sanctioned."
"As the Jason scientists argued in the 1960s, US nuclear planning could serve as a pretext for other countries and, worse, terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, to build or acquire their own bombs," she continued. "If we are not careful, our own nuclear posture could provoke the very nuclear-proliferation activities we are seeking to prevent."
Peter Hayes, the director of the Nautilus Institute, said: "The Jason study is a stark warning that using nuclear weapons against Iraq, North Korea or transnational terrorists - or threatening to do so - makes more likely the use of the only weapons that can really threaten the United States on the battlefield with untold consequences for innocent civilians here and abroad."
The declassified report was written by four leading US scientists and presented to senior US defense officials in August and September, 1966. To download the report and read excerpts, click here: http://www.nautilus.org/VietnamFOIA/index.html
On Sunday, the Los Angeles Times published commentaries by Mr. Hayes and Professor Weinberg on the implications of the Vietnam War study for the war against terrorism.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BACKGROUND - "TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA"
CONCLUSIONS AGAINST FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DURING VIETNAM STILL HOLD TODAY, AUTHORS SAY
The four scientists who wrote the 1966 report on the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam were
Freeman Dyson, Robert Gomer, S. Courtenay Wright and Stephen Weinberg, the 1979 Nobel Prize winner for physics. In interviews with the Nautilus Institute, they said they requested funds to conduct their study after overhearing discussions at the Pentagon about the possible use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam.
Professor Dyson, now at Princeton University, said in a written statement that he was alarmed to hear one aide say: "It might be a good idea to toss in a nuke from time to time, just to keep them guessing."
Weinberg, who teaches at the University of Texas, said that he "felt that the use of nuclear weapons would make the war even more destructive than it had already become. It would create a terrible precedent for the use of nuclear weapons for something other than deterrence; it wouldn't help much with the war; and it would open up the possibility of nuclear attacks on our own bases in Vietnam."
"Since nuclear weapons are excellent for obliterating cities and their occupants, they would have undoubted appeal to terrorist organizations whose restraint (if such existed) would certainly be quashed if the US made use of such devices," said Wright, a retired physicist from the University of Chicago. "And our heralded missile defense system, even if it worked, which it will not, will not stop a terrorist delivered bomb. That would not come on-board a missile. It would arrive in a suitcase, by train, car, truck or motorboat."
Three of the four Jason scientists are available today for telephone interviews. Their statements, along with contact numbers and brief biographies, are enclosed in this packet.
BOMBING PASS WOULD HAVE REQUIRED THOUSANDS OF WEAPONS
The Mu Gia pass on the Ho Chi Minh trail connected North Vietnam to Laos and was bombed extensively by the US Air Force during the war. Some 43 US airmen were killed or listed as missing in bombing missions over the pass.
To effectively interdict the Ho Chi Minh trail, the Jason scientists calculated that US Air Force bombers would need a "huge number of weapons." Quoting from a still-classified targeting study conducted by the RAND Corporation, they estimated that a "completely nuclear ROLLING THUNDER (bombing) campaign would require about 3,000 TNW per year."
POTENTIAL US TARGETS IN VIETNAM
The Jason report concluded that tactical nuclear weapons would be effective in Vietnam "only in stopping the enemy from moving large masses of men in concentrated formations." It also noted a few other potential targets, including bridges, airfields and missile sites," and argued that nuclear devices might be "used very effectively" to block roads and trails in forested areas used by North Vietnamese and NLF soldiers.
But the scientists added: "fallout from groundburst weapons cannot by itself provide a long-lasting barrier to the movement of men and supplies without endangering civilian populations at up to a distance of 200 miles."
From the perspective of the US military, one of the most chilling sections of the Jason report laid out the vulnerability of US forces in Vietnam to a nuclear attack with portable weapons supplied by either China or the Soviet Union. The scientists noted that US forces were concentrated in 14 bases, containing a total of about 70 target areas, "each packed with men, stores, equipment, or vehicles."
NLF guerrillas, the report said, were capable of transporting small nuclear weapons in small boats or trucks and could even deploy them in a mortar or recoilless rifle.
"If about 100 weapons of 10-KT (kiloton) yield each could be delivered from the base perimeters onto all 70 target areas in a coordinated strike, the US fighting capability in Vietnam would be essentially annihilated," they concluded. Even with a small number of weapons, "US casualties would still be extremely high and the degradation of US capabilities would be considerable."
The "most attractive single target," the report said, would have been the Saigon Airport, where a "single well-placed explosion" could destroy the US intelligence center and kill thousands of American soldiers. Other key targets included the troop concentrations at US bases in Pleiku, Da Nang and An Khe. "In addition to the physical effect on US forces, the news of a successful nuclear attack on a US base would have enormous propaganda value for the Communists, not only in Vietnam, but in all of Asia and Africa," the scientists concluded.
POTENTIAL US TARGETS TODAY
A similar logic applies today. As the events of 9-11 and other recent attacks have shown, the United States and US forces overseas remain highly vulnerable to attacks from weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, al Qaeda has been trying for years to acquire nuclear weapons and may have succeeded if it had remained in Afghanistan, according to a report by David Albright, a Washington analyst who worked as a UN weapons inspector in Iraq.
In recent weeks, about 150,000 US forces from the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marines have been deployed in countries surrounding Iraq in preparation for a possible invasion this spring, Many of these forces are concentrated in large US bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Quatar, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, all of which are located near the waters of the Persian Gulf and easily accessible by small boats and vehicles.
In addition to dozens of US Navy warships carrying thousands of sailors, these forces, according to the Associated Press and BBC, include:
The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force of 15,000 Marines, already in Kuwait
The 15th and 24th Marine Expeditionary Units, with 4,400 Marines, now en route to the region
Nearly 18,000 Air Force personnel, including 1,725 Air National Guardsmen, with 3,500 US personnel based at the al-Udeid air base in Quatar
The Army's 3rd Infantry Division. 4th Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division, each with about 20,000 soldiers, possibly headed to Kuwait
The Army's 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment with 6,000 soldiers and support staff, en route, possibly to Kuwait.
Nearly a thousand civilian mariners working on US Military Sealift Command ships stationed at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Southeast Asia
(excerpt from the original document)
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the military consequences of a U.S. decision to use tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Southeast Asia, under the assumption that the war remains theater-limited and that no strategic exchange occurs. The study divides into two main parts. (1) possible targets for U.S. TNW, and effects of nuclear bombardment on the ground war if the use of TNW remains unilateral; and (2) possibility and effectiveness of enemy retaliation with nuclear weapons supplied by the USSR or China. Among both military experts and the general public, there is wide agreement that the use of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia would offer the U.S. no military advantage commensurate with its political cost. This opinion is usually based on an intuitive judgment, however, rather than on detailed analysis. There is some disagreement as to whether the use of nuclear weapons would still remain unprofitable if China openly intervened with large ground forces in the Vietnam War. It therefore seemed worthwhile to make a study of the consequences that would follow from a U.S. decision to use nuclear weapons in tactical operations in Southeast Asia.
We have arbitrarily excluded strategic nuclear operations from the study. This means that we assume the annihilation of the civilian economy of North Vietnam (NVN) or China to be outside our terms of reference. Nuclear weapons are to be used tactically in the strict sense, that is to say, only on military targets, only within the theater of ground combat, and while avoiding civilian casualties so far as practicable. The reason for limiting the study to tactical use is that we wish to stay as much as possible in the realm of technical military analysis and to avoid involvement with political and moral judgments.
The study has involved four men working a total of three man-months. Such a small effort cannot deal adequately with so large a subject. Almost all our conclusions are tentative, and they should be investigated further by professional experts. We regard our study as only a beginning.
This report is divided into seven sections; Sections III and IV contain the major part of the work. Section III discusses military consequences of the U.S. use of tactical nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia, under the assumption that this use remains unilateral and that the enemy response is purely defensive. The questions that arise are: What kinds of targets exist, how many weapons of what yields could be profitably expended, and how great would be the effects on enemy ground operations? Section IV discusses the feasibility and effectiveness of enemy use of nuclear weapons against U.S. forces. Here, the emphasis is on the logistic difficulties of supplying nuclear weapons and the means of delivery from the USSR or China to guerillas in Vietnam as well as on the vulnerability of U.S. military bases. Section V briefly discusses the long-term effects that may arise if guerillas in other parts of the world acquire nuclear weapons. Section VI deals with the political consequences of U.S. use of nuclear weapons, but without any attempt at a complete political analysis
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
WHO WERE THE JASONS
For more than 40 years, an elite group of scientific advisors known as the JASON has provided the federal government with largely classified analyses on defense and arms controls issues. JASON members meet each summer. Acting on assignment from the Pentagon, the Department of Energy and other federal agencies and working on their own ideas, they emerge from seclusion six to eight weeks later, armed with detailed reports on their summer studies, which eventually help to shape the nation's scientific policies.
The JASONs, named after the mythical Jason and the Argonauts -- a group of young adventurers who embark on a journey to obtain the Golden Fleece -- were founded in 1959. At the end of World War II, many of the country's leading scientists, who had been involved in such war research as the atomic bomb and radar, left full-time government work and returned to the college campuses. To ensure that the federal government did not lose access to this valuable talent, the Defense Department sought to establish an ongoing consulting liaison with first-rate scientists. Those of the highest caliber were recruited to join the prestigious JASONs group, whose current 50-odd membership includes Nobel laureates and some of the brightest young scientists in the nation.
The vast majority of JASON's 20 to 30 annual studies remain classified, making its impact hard to gauge. In 1966, the JASONs completed three important studies--on the efficacy of strategic bombing in cutting the VC supply lines; on constructing an electronic barrier across Vietnam; and on tactical nuclear weapons. The first two reports are known to have had a major impact on then US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's views on the United States' inability to win the war.
JASON keeps an intentionally low profile, largely because of its classified work. There is no comprehensive list of members, and professors who are JASONs rarely mention the job on their resumes. Originally all male due to the era in which it was founded, 10% of its current membership is female. Since the group was founded, its research focus has shifted from a heavy emphasis on physics, to include other fields. Of the group's current membership, 19 are biologists, chemists, engineers, computer experts and other non-physicists. In an effort to remain young and relevant, new scientists are routinely rotated in and older members become less active senior advisors when they turn 65. [1].
In March 2002, JASON's future was cast into doubt when the Pentagon's Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (or DARPA) announced that it had severed its 42-year-old contract with the group. The group, which has 50 members, relies on a $1.5 million annual budget from the Department of Defense and $2.25 million from the Department of Energy and a variety of federal agencies[2]. After some anxious weeks, the group secured a new contract in June 2002, with the Department of Defense's Directorate for Research and Engineering, which oversees DARPA. Still, the rift has alienated many JASON members, many of whom have expressed fears that the Pentagon's increasingly adversarial attitude towards science may deter some scientific experts from doing research or serving on advisory panels.
Declassified US Document :TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA- 1967
WASHINGTON - US officials rejected the use of tactical nuclear weapons during the Vietnam War because of the catastrophic effect such a strike would have had on US global interests and the possibility that US forces "would be essentially annihilated" in retaliatory raids by nuclear-armed guerrilla forces, according to participants in a secret Pentagon study released March 9 by the Nautilus Institute, a California research group.
Senator Dianne Feinstein, D-CA, read parts of the declassified report, written by a group of scientists known as the Jasons, into the Congressional Record on Monday.
"The conclusions of the Jason report are as valid, realistic and frightening today as they were in 1967," Senator Feinstein said in a statement on the Senate floor. "I sincerely believe that any first use of nuclear weapons by the United States can not and should not be sanctioned."
"As the Jason scientists argued in the 1960s, US nuclear planning could serve as a pretext for other countries and, worse, terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, to build or acquire their own bombs," she continued. "If we are not careful, our own nuclear posture could provoke the very nuclear-proliferation activities we are seeking to prevent."
Peter Hayes, the director of the Nautilus Institute, said: "The Jason study is a stark warning that using nuclear weapons against Iraq, North Korea or transnational terrorists - or threatening to do so - makes more likely the use of the only weapons that can really threaten the United States on the battlefield with untold consequences for innocent civilians here and abroad."
The declassified report was written by four leading US scientists and presented to senior US defense officials in August and September, 1966. To download the report and read excerpts, click here: http://www.nautilus.org/VietnamFOIA/index.html
On Sunday, the Los Angeles Times published commentaries by Mr. Hayes and Professor Weinberg on the implications of the Vietnam War study for the war against terrorism.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BACKGROUND - "TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA"
CONCLUSIONS AGAINST FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DURING VIETNAM STILL HOLD TODAY, AUTHORS SAY
The four scientists who wrote the 1966 report on the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam were
Freeman Dyson, Robert Gomer, S. Courtenay Wright and Stephen Weinberg, the 1979 Nobel Prize winner for physics. In interviews with the Nautilus Institute, they said they requested funds to conduct their study after overhearing discussions at the Pentagon about the possible use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam.
Professor Dyson, now at Princeton University, said in a written statement that he was alarmed to hear one aide say: "It might be a good idea to toss in a nuke from time to time, just to keep them guessing."
Weinberg, who teaches at the University of Texas, said that he "felt that the use of nuclear weapons would make the war even more destructive than it had already become. It would create a terrible precedent for the use of nuclear weapons for something other than deterrence; it wouldn't help much with the war; and it would open up the possibility of nuclear attacks on our own bases in Vietnam."
"Since nuclear weapons are excellent for obliterating cities and their occupants, they would have undoubted appeal to terrorist organizations whose restraint (if such existed) would certainly be quashed if the US made use of such devices," said Wright, a retired physicist from the University of Chicago. "And our heralded missile defense system, even if it worked, which it will not, will not stop a terrorist delivered bomb. That would not come on-board a missile. It would arrive in a suitcase, by train, car, truck or motorboat."
Three of the four Jason scientists are available today for telephone interviews. Their statements, along with contact numbers and brief biographies, are enclosed in this packet.
BOMBING PASS WOULD HAVE REQUIRED THOUSANDS OF WEAPONS
The Mu Gia pass on the Ho Chi Minh trail connected North Vietnam to Laos and was bombed extensively by the US Air Force during the war. Some 43 US airmen were killed or listed as missing in bombing missions over the pass.
To effectively interdict the Ho Chi Minh trail, the Jason scientists calculated that US Air Force bombers would need a "huge number of weapons." Quoting from a still-classified targeting study conducted by the RAND Corporation, they estimated that a "completely nuclear ROLLING THUNDER (bombing) campaign would require about 3,000 TNW per year."
POTENTIAL US TARGETS IN VIETNAM
The Jason report concluded that tactical nuclear weapons would be effective in Vietnam "only in stopping the enemy from moving large masses of men in concentrated formations." It also noted a few other potential targets, including bridges, airfields and missile sites," and argued that nuclear devices might be "used very effectively" to block roads and trails in forested areas used by North Vietnamese and NLF soldiers.
But the scientists added: "fallout from groundburst weapons cannot by itself provide a long-lasting barrier to the movement of men and supplies without endangering civilian populations at up to a distance of 200 miles."
From the perspective of the US military, one of the most chilling sections of the Jason report laid out the vulnerability of US forces in Vietnam to a nuclear attack with portable weapons supplied by either China or the Soviet Union. The scientists noted that US forces were concentrated in 14 bases, containing a total of about 70 target areas, "each packed with men, stores, equipment, or vehicles."
NLF guerrillas, the report said, were capable of transporting small nuclear weapons in small boats or trucks and could even deploy them in a mortar or recoilless rifle.
"If about 100 weapons of 10-KT (kiloton) yield each could be delivered from the base perimeters onto all 70 target areas in a coordinated strike, the US fighting capability in Vietnam would be essentially annihilated," they concluded. Even with a small number of weapons, "US casualties would still be extremely high and the degradation of US capabilities would be considerable."
The "most attractive single target," the report said, would have been the Saigon Airport, where a "single well-placed explosion" could destroy the US intelligence center and kill thousands of American soldiers. Other key targets included the troop concentrations at US bases in Pleiku, Da Nang and An Khe. "In addition to the physical effect on US forces, the news of a successful nuclear attack on a US base would have enormous propaganda value for the Communists, not only in Vietnam, but in all of Asia and Africa," the scientists concluded.
POTENTIAL US TARGETS TODAY
A similar logic applies today. As the events of 9-11 and other recent attacks have shown, the United States and US forces overseas remain highly vulnerable to attacks from weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, al Qaeda has been trying for years to acquire nuclear weapons and may have succeeded if it had remained in Afghanistan, according to a report by David Albright, a Washington analyst who worked as a UN weapons inspector in Iraq.
In recent weeks, about 150,000 US forces from the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marines have been deployed in countries surrounding Iraq in preparation for a possible invasion this spring, Many of these forces are concentrated in large US bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Quatar, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, all of which are located near the waters of the Persian Gulf and easily accessible by small boats and vehicles.
In addition to dozens of US Navy warships carrying thousands of sailors, these forces, according to the Associated Press and BBC, include:
The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force of 15,000 Marines, already in Kuwait
The 15th and 24th Marine Expeditionary Units, with 4,400 Marines, now en route to the region
Nearly 18,000 Air Force personnel, including 1,725 Air National Guardsmen, with 3,500 US personnel based at the al-Udeid air base in Quatar
The Army's 3rd Infantry Division. 4th Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division, each with about 20,000 soldiers, possibly headed to Kuwait
The Army's 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment with 6,000 soldiers and support staff, en route, possibly to Kuwait.
Nearly a thousand civilian mariners working on US Military Sealift Command ships stationed at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Southeast Asia
(excerpt from the original document)
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the military consequences of a U.S. decision to use tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Southeast Asia, under the assumption that the war remains theater-limited and that no strategic exchange occurs. The study divides into two main parts. (1) possible targets for U.S. TNW, and effects of nuclear bombardment on the ground war if the use of TNW remains unilateral; and (2) possibility and effectiveness of enemy retaliation with nuclear weapons supplied by the USSR or China. Among both military experts and the general public, there is wide agreement that the use of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia would offer the U.S. no military advantage commensurate with its political cost. This opinion is usually based on an intuitive judgment, however, rather than on detailed analysis. There is some disagreement as to whether the use of nuclear weapons would still remain unprofitable if China openly intervened with large ground forces in the Vietnam War. It therefore seemed worthwhile to make a study of the consequences that would follow from a U.S. decision to use nuclear weapons in tactical operations in Southeast Asia.
We have arbitrarily excluded strategic nuclear operations from the study. This means that we assume the annihilation of the civilian economy of North Vietnam (NVN) or China to be outside our terms of reference. Nuclear weapons are to be used tactically in the strict sense, that is to say, only on military targets, only within the theater of ground combat, and while avoiding civilian casualties so far as practicable. The reason for limiting the study to tactical use is that we wish to stay as much as possible in the realm of technical military analysis and to avoid involvement with political and moral judgments.
The study has involved four men working a total of three man-months. Such a small effort cannot deal adequately with so large a subject. Almost all our conclusions are tentative, and they should be investigated further by professional experts. We regard our study as only a beginning.
This report is divided into seven sections; Sections III and IV contain the major part of the work. Section III discusses military consequences of the U.S. use of tactical nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia, under the assumption that this use remains unilateral and that the enemy response is purely defensive. The questions that arise are: What kinds of targets exist, how many weapons of what yields could be profitably expended, and how great would be the effects on enemy ground operations? Section IV discusses the feasibility and effectiveness of enemy use of nuclear weapons against U.S. forces. Here, the emphasis is on the logistic difficulties of supplying nuclear weapons and the means of delivery from the USSR or China to guerillas in Vietnam as well as on the vulnerability of U.S. military bases. Section V briefly discusses the long-term effects that may arise if guerillas in other parts of the world acquire nuclear weapons. Section VI deals with the political consequences of U.S. use of nuclear weapons, but without any attempt at a complete political analysis
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
WHO WERE THE JASONS
For more than 40 years, an elite group of scientific advisors known as the JASON has provided the federal government with largely classified analyses on defense and arms controls issues. JASON members meet each summer. Acting on assignment from the Pentagon, the Department of Energy and other federal agencies and working on their own ideas, they emerge from seclusion six to eight weeks later, armed with detailed reports on their summer studies, which eventually help to shape the nation's scientific policies.
The JASONs, named after the mythical Jason and the Argonauts -- a group of young adventurers who embark on a journey to obtain the Golden Fleece -- were founded in 1959. At the end of World War II, many of the country's leading scientists, who had been involved in such war research as the atomic bomb and radar, left full-time government work and returned to the college campuses. To ensure that the federal government did not lose access to this valuable talent, the Defense Department sought to establish an ongoing consulting liaison with first-rate scientists. Those of the highest caliber were recruited to join the prestigious JASONs group, whose current 50-odd membership includes Nobel laureates and some of the brightest young scientists in the nation.
The vast majority of JASON's 20 to 30 annual studies remain classified, making its impact hard to gauge. In 1966, the JASONs completed three important studies--on the efficacy of strategic bombing in cutting the VC supply lines; on constructing an electronic barrier across Vietnam; and on tactical nuclear weapons. The first two reports are known to have had a major impact on then US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's views on the United States' inability to win the war.
JASON keeps an intentionally low profile, largely because of its classified work. There is no comprehensive list of members, and professors who are JASONs rarely mention the job on their resumes. Originally all male due to the era in which it was founded, 10% of its current membership is female. Since the group was founded, its research focus has shifted from a heavy emphasis on physics, to include other fields. Of the group's current membership, 19 are biologists, chemists, engineers, computer experts and other non-physicists. In an effort to remain young and relevant, new scientists are routinely rotated in and older members become less active senior advisors when they turn 65. [1].
In March 2002, JASON's future was cast into doubt when the Pentagon's Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (or DARPA) announced that it had severed its 42-year-old contract with the group. The group, which has 50 members, relies on a $1.5 million annual budget from the Department of Defense and $2.25 million from the Department of Energy and a variety of federal agencies[2]. After some anxious weeks, the group secured a new contract in June 2002, with the Department of Defense's Directorate for Research and Engineering, which oversees DARPA. Still, the rift has alienated many JASON members, many of whom have expressed fears that the Pentagon's increasingly adversarial attitude towards science may deter some scientific experts from doing research or serving on advisory panels.
