Calibrated War Makes Comeback
By
Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, March 21, 2003; Page A01
The war that the U.S. military has launched in Iraq isn't the kind it has been told by Colin Powell and his peers that it should be ready to fight.
Since the American policy of gradual "escalation" of military force ended in failure in Vietnam, a generation of officers has been shaped by the notion that when the nation goes to war, it must use its overwhelming power to decisively defeat enemies. But the opening phase of the latest Persian Gulf war has been marked instead by a few sharp, narrowly focused blows aimed at bringing down the government of Saddam Hussein without having to resort to a conventional, all-out attack.
Since yesterday, U.S. and British forces have launched about 60 cruise missiles at a few key "leadership" targets, dropped a handful of bombs, and sent Special Operations forces to reconnoiter key targets. Then they accelerated the timing of the ground war, sending several thousand troops across the border from Kuwait. Perhaps most importantly, the United States intensified a months-long psychological operations campaign aimed at turning the loyalties of the Iraqi army, or at least persuading it that resistance is futile. According to a senior Bush administration official, surrender negotiations were underway yesterday between U.S. officials and a number of Iraqi unit commanders.
"What they're trying to do right now is to punish the regime and give forces a chance to capitulate," this insider said. "It's a selective use of force to see if you can separate the people from the regime."
If this last chance to oust Hussein does not work, he added, "this is a force that has a plan to annihilate the Iraqi military, if it has to." He was referring to the relentless, "shock and awe" bombing campaign that some Pentagon officials had predicted might begin the war.
Another defense official agreed with that description of the war plan, saying that the first day of strikes -- which also have targeted some headquarters buildings of the Republican Guard, some of Hussein's most loyal troops -- have been intended "to see if we can try to tip things, first."
But this official warned that time is running out, and that the plan calls for escalating soon to extensive bombing raids.
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld summarized this carrot-and-stick approach at a Pentagon briefing yesterday. "We continue to feel that there's no need for a broader conflict if the Iraqi leaders act to save themselves," he said. But, he continued, "what will follow will not be a repeat of any other conflict. It will be of a force and scope and scale that has been beyond what has been seen before."
But for the moment, large-scale bombing remains just a plan. The first day of the war showed a probing, even constrained use of force, a tactic that, despite the widespread chatter about "shock and awe," is in keeping with the actual war plan, said defense officials familiar with it. "Except for the attack [on Hussein and his aides] last night, it was always meant to look like this," a senior defense official said. "The idea is to continue the confusion and chaos among them."
In the days and weeks to come, Pentagon officials promise, the U.S. military will demonstrate a mindset that is more flexible, more integrated in ground and air operations, and more willing to take risks than it was during the first Persian Gulf War 12 years ago. Special Operations troops, almost ignored during that war, have been operating inside Iraq for weeks, and are expected to take a central role in coming days.
Ground and air forces will operate simultaneously as U.S. armored units charge with almost unprecedented speed toward Baghdad. U.S. ground commanders also showed flexibility yesterday when they accelerated their plans to invade Iraq -- some by just a few hours, some by as much as a full day. Their movement came after just one day of limited bombing, in contrast to the five weeks of airstrikes that preceded the U.S. ground war in 1991. The total American and British force invading Iraq is about a third the size of the ground force that was gathered to liberate the far smaller nation of Kuwait back then.
"If this is successful it will open up more flexibility in future operations," said Duke University political scientist Peter Feaver, an expert on the political implications of the use of force. "It would certainly be existence of a proof that other approaches do not lead to certain disaster."
If the war does indeed go as planned, much of the credit is likely to be given to Rumsfeld, who by several accounts over the last year has pushed Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the military commander of the war, to come up with a more innovative and daring plan for attacking Iraq than Franks originally proposed.
Rumsfeld has made "transforming" the military -- making it discard Cold War-era approaches and leap into the Information Age -- the centerpiece of his stewardship at the Pentagon. But it appears at times that the effect of his approach has been to dismantle Powell's twin legacies at the Pentagon: a powerful chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the so-called Powell Doctrine.
Now secretary of state, Powell was the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs to take office under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 that reorganized the Pentagon. When he became the nation's top military officer in 1989, he capitalized on some of the provisions of that law to make the chairmanship far more influential than it had been. He also helped transform the staff of the Joint Chiefs from a relative backwater into a powerhouse that at times drove defense policy.
At the same time, he came to be closely associated with a new approach to the exercise of military power. Somewhat simplified, it maintains that when the United States goes to war, it should always go in with overwhelming force, pursue clear and limited objectives, and disengage as soon as possible through what came to be called an "exit strategy." This formulation, some some 15 years after Vietnam, helped Americans to once again be comfortable with the use of military force.
Over the last two years, however, Rumsfeld has challenged both those positions. Inside the Pentagon, he has imposed more civilian control over the Joint Staff, sometimes stepping on the toes of generals in the process. By some accounts, he also has diminished the power of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
Meanwhile, the war strategy now unfolding in Iraq, which Rumsfeld played a major role in shaping, begins with a restrained use of force, followed by the escalation of bombing as needed, and eventually, after the combat ends, the occupation of another country for an indeterminate time. If the plan works, the Powell Doctrine effectively will have been discarded
Calibrated War Makes Comeback
By
Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, March 21, 2003; Page A01
The war that the U.S. military has launched in Iraq isn't the kind it has been told by Colin Powell and his peers that it should be ready to fight.
Since the American policy of gradual "escalation" of military force ended in failure in Vietnam, a generation of officers has been shaped by the notion that when the nation goes to war, it must use its overwhelming power to decisively defeat enemies. But the opening phase of the latest Persian Gulf war has been marked instead by a few sharp, narrowly focused blows aimed at bringing down the government of Saddam Hussein without having to resort to a conventional, all-out attack.
Since yesterday, U.S. and British forces have launched about 60 cruise missiles at a few key "leadership" targets, dropped a handful of bombs, and sent Special Operations forces to reconnoiter key targets. Then they accelerated the timing of the ground war, sending several thousand troops across the border from Kuwait. Perhaps most importantly, the United States intensified a months-long psychological operations campaign aimed at turning the loyalties of the Iraqi army, or at least persuading it that resistance is futile. According to a senior Bush administration official, surrender negotiations were underway yesterday between U.S. officials and a number of Iraqi unit commanders.
"What they're trying to do right now is to punish the regime and give forces a chance to capitulate," this insider said. "It's a selective use of force to see if you can separate the people from the regime."
If this last chance to oust Hussein does not work, he added, "this is a force that has a plan to annihilate the Iraqi military, if it has to." He was referring to the relentless, "shock and awe" bombing campaign that some Pentagon officials had predicted might begin the war.
Another defense official agreed with that description of the war plan, saying that the first day of strikes -- which also have targeted some headquarters buildings of the Republican Guard, some of Hussein's most loyal troops -- have been intended "to see if we can try to tip things, first."
But this official warned that time is running out, and that the plan calls for escalating soon to extensive bombing raids.
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld summarized this carrot-and-stick approach at a Pentagon briefing yesterday. "We continue to feel that there's no need for a broader conflict if the Iraqi leaders act to save themselves," he said. But, he continued, "what will follow will not be a repeat of any other conflict. It will be of a force and scope and scale that has been beyond what has been seen before."
But for the moment, large-scale bombing remains just a plan. The first day of the war showed a probing, even constrained use of force, a tactic that, despite the widespread chatter about "shock and awe," is in keeping with the actual war plan, said defense officials familiar with it. "Except for the attack [on Hussein and his aides] last night, it was always meant to look like this," a senior defense official said. "The idea is to continue the confusion and chaos among them."
In the days and weeks to come, Pentagon officials promise, the U.S. military will demonstrate a mindset that is more flexible, more integrated in ground and air operations, and more willing to take risks than it was during the first Persian Gulf War 12 years ago. Special Operations troops, almost ignored during that war, have been operating inside Iraq for weeks, and are expected to take a central role in coming days.
Ground and air forces will operate simultaneously as U.S. armored units charge with almost unprecedented speed toward Baghdad. U.S. ground commanders also showed flexibility yesterday when they accelerated their plans to invade Iraq -- some by just a few hours, some by as much as a full day. Their movement came after just one day of limited bombing, in contrast to the five weeks of airstrikes that preceded the U.S. ground war in 1991. The total American and British force invading Iraq is about a third the size of the ground force that was gathered to liberate the far smaller nation of Kuwait back then.
"If this is successful it will open up more flexibility in future operations," said Duke University political scientist Peter Feaver, an expert on the political implications of the use of force. "It would certainly be existence of a proof that other approaches do not lead to certain disaster."
If the war does indeed go as planned, much of the credit is likely to be given to Rumsfeld, who by several accounts over the last year has pushed Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the military commander of the war, to come up with a more innovative and daring plan for attacking Iraq than Franks originally proposed.
Rumsfeld has made "transforming" the military -- making it discard Cold War-era approaches and leap into the Information Age -- the centerpiece of his stewardship at the Pentagon. But it appears at times that the effect of his approach has been to dismantle Powell's twin legacies at the Pentagon: a powerful chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the so-called Powell Doctrine.
Now secretary of state, Powell was the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs to take office under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 that reorganized the Pentagon. When he became the nation's top military officer in 1989, he capitalized on some of the provisions of that law to make the chairmanship far more influential than it had been. He also helped transform the staff of the Joint Chiefs from a relative backwater into a powerhouse that at times drove defense policy.
At the same time, he came to be closely associated with a new approach to the exercise of military power. Somewhat simplified, it maintains that when the United States goes to war, it should always go in with overwhelming force, pursue clear and limited objectives, and disengage as soon as possible through what came to be called an "exit strategy." This formulation, some some 15 years after Vietnam, helped Americans to once again be comfortable with the use of military force.
Over the last two years, however, Rumsfeld has challenged both those positions. Inside the Pentagon, he has imposed more civilian control over the Joint Staff, sometimes stepping on the toes of generals in the process. By some accounts, he also has diminished the power of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
Meanwhile, the war strategy now unfolding in Iraq, which Rumsfeld played a major role in shaping, begins with a restrained use of force, followed by the escalation of bombing as needed, and eventually, after the combat ends, the occupation of another country for an indeterminate time. If the plan works, the Powell Doctrine effectively will have been discarded
